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OPINION OF THE COURT 
                
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge.  
 This matter involves an appeal by Robert Boggi from a final 
judgment of conviction and sentence following a criminal jury 
trial in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania, and a cross-appeal by the United 
States.  The Government challenges the district court's 
interpretation and application of the Sentencing Guidelines. 
Although we find no merit to the trial errors alleged by Boggi 
and therefore will affirm the judgment of conviction, we conclude 
that the district court applied the incorrect Guideline provision 
in calculating Boggi's sentence.  Therefore, we will remand the 
matter to the district court with instructions to recalculate the 
sentence using the appropriate Guideline.    
 
I.  BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 From 1984 until his conviction in this case in 1994, Robert 
Boggi was the business agent for Philadelphia-based Local 1073 of 
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the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America 
("UBC").  The UBC is an international union consisting of 
numerous affiliated local unions and district councils throughout 
the United States and Canada which represent carpenters and other 
types of skilled tradespersons.  As business agent for Local 
1073, Boggi was responsible for overseeing the daily operations 
of the union whose members were primarily engaged in residential 
carpentry.  On May 6, 1994, a federal grand jury returned a 
superseding indictment against Boggi, charging him with exacting 
numerous illegal payments and gifts from contractors between 1984 
and 1990.  Specifically, Boggi was charged with one count of 
racketeering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (Count 1); 
three counts of unlawful receipt of money or a thing of value by 
a union official, in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 186 (Counts 2-4); 
and one count of extortion conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1951 (Count 5).  The indictment also sought the forfeiture of 
the racketeering proceeds pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (Count 6). 
 On August 2, 1994, following a seven-day trial, the jury 
returned a guilty verdict on several of the RICO related offenses 
including racketeering, extortion, and extortion conspiracy. 
Thereafter, Boggi filed a motion for judgment of acquittal or, in 
the alternative, for a new trial.  On December 29, 1994, the 
district court denied Boggi's motion, and on January 5, 1995, the 
district court sentenced Boggi to 48 months imprisonment.  The 
district court ruled that U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1, which establishes 
penalties for extortion by public officials, was the applicable 
Guideline provision and sentenced Boggi accordingly.  In doing 
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so, the court overruled the Government's argument that the 
applicable Guideline was U.S.S.G  § 2B3.2.  This appeal and cross 
appeal followed.  
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
 Boggi alleges numerous trial errors.  He complains that the 
district court improperly excluded certain evidence that would 
have established his reputation for good character, that the 
dates of the crimes charged were impermissibly vague, that the 
evidence was insufficient to support the verdict, and that the 
prosecution should have been barred by the statute of 
limitations.  The district court carefully, and correctly 
evaluated each of these claims in the Memorandum Opinion it filed 
in support of its denial of Boggi's post-verdict motion for 
acquittal, and we need not reexamine these issues here.  
 We focus our attention instead on the Government's cross-
appeal which challenges the district court's interpretation and 
application of the Sentencing Guidelines.  The Government argues 
that the district court improperly applied § 2C1.1 of the 
Sentencing Guidelines to Boggi's extortion offenses and that the 
applicable Guideline was § 2B3.2.   
 The district court applied the Guideline manual effective 
November 1, 1989 because the last offense charged was in 1990, 
and the court's application of the 1989 version of the Guidelines 
is not contested.  In order to appreciate the impact of the 
sentencing error alleged by the Government, it is necessary to 
first review how the district court calculated the sentence it 
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imposed.  The court first separated the counts of conviction into 
three groups of closely related counts pursuant to U.S.S.G. 
§3D1.2.  Group One consisted of most of the racketeering acts, 
which constituted Taft-Hartley Act violations including the 
receipt of payments from Samuel Kaufman, a business man who ran a 
company that did carpentry contracting and frequently hired non-
union workers.  Group Two consisted of racketeering acts arising 
from payments the Property Corporation of America ("PCA") made in 
order to avoid picketing at the Polo Run apartment development 
where certain contracts had been awarded to non-union workers. 
Group Three consisted of racketeering acts arising from payments 
received from Al Bienenfeld, owner of Leslie Homes, Inc., a 
residential real estate development company, in connection with 
work being done by non-union workers at a condominium 
development. 
 Section 2E1.1 of the Guidelines assigns a RICO violation the 
greater of a base offense level of 19 or the offense level of the 
underlying racketeering acts.  In order to determine the sentence 
it was therefore necessary for the district court to calculate 
the offense level of the underlying racketeering activity, then 
compare the result with the alternative minimum base offense 
level applicable to RICO. 
 The court applied § 2E5.6 to Group One and determined that 
the base offense level was 10.3  The court then added two levels 
for abuse of a position of trust (§ 3B1.1), three levels 
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 A subsequent amendment to the Guidelines deleted § 2E5.6 by 
consolidating it with § 2E5.1, effective November 1, 1993. 
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corresponding to the value of cash and goods received by Boggi (§ 
2F1.1), and two more levels for obstruction of justice (§ 3C1.1), 
bringing the total offense level for Group One to 17.  App. at 
1302-08.   
 The court applied § 2C1.1 to the offenses in Group Two, 
which included the PCA payments.  In doing so, the court rejected 
the recommendation of the presentence investigation and the 
Government, as they both recommended that the court apply § 2B3.2 
to this Group of offenses.  Section 2C1.1 yielded a base offense 
level of 10.  The court applied a five-level increase 
corresponding to the amount of money extorted (§ 2F1.1), a two-
level increase for abuse of a position of trust (§ 3B1.1), and a 
two-level increase for obstruction of justice (§ 3C1.1), bringing 
the total offense level for Group Two to 19.  App. at 1309. 
 The court also applied § 2C1.1 to Group Three which included 
the payments from Al Bienenfeld.  That Guideline resulted in a 
base offense level of 10.  The court then applied a one-level 
increase corresponding to the amount of the extortionate payment 
(§ 2F1.1), a two-level increase for abuse of a position of trust 
(§ 3B1.1), and a two-level increase for obstruction of justice (§ 
3C1.1), bringing the total offense level for Group Three to 15. 
App. at 1313. 
 The rules for combining the offense levels of the three 
groups, set forth at § 3D1.4, yielded a combined offense level of 
22.  App. at 1314.  Applying the alternative minimum base offense 
level of 19, see § 2E1.1(a), to the RICO offenses yielded a total 
offense level of 23, after two levels each were added for abuse 
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of a position of trust (§ 3B1.1) and obstruction of justice (§ 
3C1.1).  App. at 1314.  Because the minimum base level of 19 
yielded the greater total offense level (23 instead of 22), the 
court sentenced Boggi based upon that calculation.  Thus, the 
court concluded that the total offense level was 23 and the 
Guideline imprisonment range was 46-57 months.  App. at 1314. The 
court sentenced Boggi to 48 months imprisonment.  App. at 1345.  
 By contrast, had § 2B3.2 been applied, the Guideline 
calculations would have been as follows: The total offense level 
for Group One remains at level 17; Group Two becomes a total 
offense level of 23 (base offense level 18, plus one-level 
corresponding to the amount of the extortion as per § 2B3.1, plus 
two-levels for abuse of a position of trust, plus two-levels for 
obstruction of justice); Group Three becomes a total offense 
level of 22 (same as Group Two except that the amount of money 
extorted results in no increase).  Under the rules for combining 
the groups set forth at § 3D1.4, the combined offense level 
becomes 26 (which is higher than the alternative minimum RICO 
calculation of 23), corresponding to 63-78 months imprisonment, 
which is, at a minimum, 15 more months imprisonment than the 48 
months to which Boggi was sentenced under the district court's 
calculation. 
 When the district court decided to apply § 2C1.1 to the 
extortion offenses (Groups Two and Three) rather than § 2B3.2, 
the Government objected based upon the relevant Guideline 
commentary which instructs that § 2B3.2 should ordinarily be 
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applied to a threat to cause labor problems.  See USSG § 2B3.2, 
comment. (n.2).  The district judge then responded: 
Yeah, but that's ordinarily.  This is 
different than ordinarily because it seems to 
me that the threat and the bodily -- there 
was no bodily injury.  There certainly wasn't 
any serious bodily injury.  There was -- no 
one's ever argued there was permanent or 
life-threatening bodily injury. 
App. at 1311.  The Government further argued that § 2C1.1 was 
clearly inapplicable because, by its terms, it addressed public 
officials acting under official right, whereas Boggi was a 
private union officer.   App. at 1312.   
 Our analysis of the appropriate Guideline to be applied here 
must, of course, begin with the text of the Guidelines in 
question.  Section 2C1.1, the Guideline applied by the district 
court, states in part: 
Offering, Giving, Soliciting, or Receiving a Bribe; 
Extortion Under Color of Official Right 
 
(a) Base Offense Level: 10 
 
(b) Specific Offense Characteristics 
 
(1) If the offense involved more than one  bribe or extortion, increase by 2 levels.
 
(2) (If more than one applies, use the  greater): 
 
(A) If the value of the payment,  the benefit received or to be 
increase by the corresponding 
number of levels from the table in 
§ 2F1.1 (Fraud and Deceit). 
 
(B) If the offense involved a  payment for the purpose of 
USSG § 2C1.1. 
 By comparison, § 2B3.2, entitled "Extortion by Force or 
Threat of Injury or Serious Damage," states in relevant part: 
(a) Base Offense Level: 18 
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(b) Specific Offense Characteristics 
 
(1) If the offense involved an express or  implied threat of deat
 
(2) If the greater of the amount demanded or 
the loss to the victim exceeded $10,000, 
increase by the corresponding number of 
levels from the table in § 2B3.1(b)(6). 
 
(3) . . . 
 
(B)  If the offense involved 
preparation to carry out a threat 
of (i) death, (ii) serious bodily 
injury, (iii) kidnapping, or (iv) 
product tampering; or if the 
participant(s) otherwise 
demonstrated the ability to carry 
out such a threat, increase by 3 
levels. 
USSG § 2B3.2. 
 Because neither the text of § 2C1.1 nor § 2B3.2 mentions 
union officials or labor disputes per se, we will look to the 
application notes and commentary for instruction on which of 
these two Guidelines should be applied under the facts before us. 
See United States v. Bierley, 922 F.2d 1061, 1066 (3d Cir. 1990). 
The "commentary in the Guidelines Manual that interprets or 
explains a guideline is authoritative unless it violates the 
Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a 
plainly erroneous reading of, that guideline."  Stinson v. United 
States,    U.S.   , 113 S. Ct. 1913, 1915 (1993).  A court's 
"[f]ailure to follow such commentary could constitute an 
incorrect application of the guidelines, subjecting the sentence 
to reversal on appeal."  USSG § 1B1.7.   
 According to the background commentary, § 2C1.1 "applies to 
a person who offers or gives a bribe for a corrupt purpose, such 
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as inducing a public official to participate in a fraud or to 
influence his official actions, or to a public official who 
solicits or accepts such a bribe."  USSG § 2C1.1, comment. 
(backg'd.).  The background commentary further instructs: 
 Section 2C1.1 also applies to extortion 
by officers or employees of the United States 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 872, and Hobbs 
Act extortion, or attempted extortion, under 
color of official right, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1951.  The Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 
§1951(b)(2), applies in part to any person 
who acts "under color of official right."  
This statute applies to extortionate conduct 
by, among others, officials and employees of 
state and local governments.  The panoply of 
conduct that may be prosecuted under the 
Hobbs Act varies from a city building 
inspector who demands a small amount of money 
from the owner of an apartment building to 
ignore code violations to a state court judge 
who extracts substantial interest-free loans 
from attorneys who have cases pending in his 
court. 
Id. (emphasis added).   
 The commentary to § 2B3.2, the provision which the 
Government argues should have been applied, states: 
This guideline applies if there was any 
threat, express or implied, that reasonably 
could be interpreted as one to injure a 
person or physically damage property, or any 
comparably serious threat, such as to drive 
an enterprise out of business.  Even if the 
threat does not in itself imply violence, the 
possibility of violence or serious adverse 
consequences may be inferred from the 
circumstances of the threat or the reputation 
of the person making it.  An ambiguous 
threat, such as "pay up or else," or a threat 
to cause labor problems, ordinarily should be 
treated under this section. 
USSG § 2B3.2, comment. (n.2) (emphasis added).   
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 It is therefore clear from the relevant commentary that 
§2B3.2 does not require the threat of serious bodily injury for 
its application.  There is evidence regarding Boggi's actions as 
a union agent and his threats to cause labor problems which would 
support the application of § 2B3.2.  Although we have not 
previously reviewed a district court's construction and 
application of § 2B3.2 in the labor union context, other courts 
of appeals have, and our conclusion here is consistent with the 
reasoning of those courts.  
 In United States v. Penn, 966 F.2d 55 (2d Cir. 1992), the 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld a district court's 
sentence under § 2B3.2 following the defendant's guilty plea to a 
charge of extortion. The court rejected the defendant's arguments 
that he should have been sentenced under the more lenient 
provisions of § 2B3.3 which addresses "Blackmail and Similar 
Forms of Extortion."  There, the defendant, Terrance Penn, had 
posed as an INS agent and threatened to shut down a service 
station that employed illegal aliens unless the owner of the 
service station acceded to Penn's demand of a cash payment.   The 
service station owner "testified that he believed Penn was 
capable of physical bodily harm, and that he feared the station 
would be put out of business if Penn carried out his threats." 
Id.  The district court found that Penn's initial demand for 
cash, his intimidating tactics, and his implicit and explicit 
threats to put the service station owner out of business 
justified sentencing under § 2B3.2.  Id.  The court of appeals 
affirmed saying: "the record clearly supports an inference that 
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Penn sought to generate fear through physical intimidation and 
through explicit and implicit threats of serious economic injury. 
Thus, Penn's conduct fits squarely under § 2B3.2."  Id. at 57. 
 In United States v. Williams, 952 F.2d 1504 (6th Cir. 1991), 
the court of appeals found no error in the district court's 
application of § 2B3.2 in sentencing a defendant on extortion 
offenses where the "defendant's exploitation of the victims' 
fears was based on the implied threat that, unless payments were 
forthcoming, . . . the victims would suffer a devastating 
economic loss."  Id. at 1514.  Although the defendant in Williams 
argued for the application of § 2C1.1 as an alternative, the 
court rejected this argument, explaining:  
Section 2C1.1 is designed for the punishment 
of a person who bribes a public official or 
'a public official who solicits or accepts 
such a bribe.'  USSG § 2C1.1, comment. 
(backg'd.).  Defendant, however, was not a 
public official, and [the] Sheriff . . ., 
whose political force was the weapon employed 
by defendant, was to be bribed in a matter 
not involving his official actions . . . . 
Id.  Thus, the court concluded that "the implicit threats 
employed by the defendant bring his case within the ambit of 
section 2B3.2."  Id.  The court further concluded that "the fact 
that neither defendant nor his shadowy counterpart, [the] Sheriff 
. . ., were to take any official action in exchange for a bribe 
tends to take this case out of the operation of section 2C1.1." 
Id.  See also United States v. Hummer, 916 F.2d 186, 194 (4th 
Cir. 1990) (observing that from the language of § 2B3.2's 
commentary note 2 "a reasonable inference can be drawn that the 
Commission contemplated extortion threats to harm one or a few 
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persons, to damage property, or to economically injure or ruin a 
business enterprise"). 
 Here, as in Williams, the district court had no sound basis 
for treating Boggi's extortion offenses as bribes, and sentencing 
Boggi under the Guideline provision directed at bribery involving 
public officials.  Boggi was not a public official and he did not 
accept money in exchange for action involving any official 
duties.  Although Boggi did violate a position of trust as he 
violated the trust that his union members had placed in him, such 
a breach occurs whenever a union official engages in extortion. 
The comments to § 2B3.2 clearly establish that the Sentencing 
Commission did not intend that such breaches would be treated the 
same as a public official who violates the public's trust. 
Similarly, the commentary establishes that the Commission did not 
intend that a sentencing court would require that extortionate 
threats be accompanied with threats of serious bodily injury 
before they would fall within the scope of § 2B3.2.  Here, the 
Government established Boggi's blatant "threat[s] to cause labor 
problems" and that conduct falls within the parameters of §2B3.2.   
 The evidence would support a finding that Boggi used 
explicit and implicit threats of labor strikes and labor unrest 
that would result in economic injury, or ruin, for a given 
project.  PCA and Bienenfeld both acquiesced in Boggi's demands 
so that Boggi would not use his position with the labor union to 
inflict serious economic harm.  Bienenfeld testified that if 
Boggi had ordered the union carpenters to leave the construction 
site leaving only the non-union workers, the disruption of work 
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would have caused Bienenfeld's lender to foreclose and revoke a 
$10 million loan within a matter of hours.  App. at 861-62. 
Similarly, Dean Wilson, a partner in PCA, testified that he and 
the other partners were personally liable for $12 million and 
that a picket line by Boggi's union could have spelled disaster 
for the project.  App. at 168-73.  Boggi's threats were also 
taken seriously by James Bormann, the superintendent at Polo Run. 
Bormann testified that Boggi always behaved in an intimidating 
manner and would generally conclude his visits to Polo Run by 
vowing to "take his business to the streets."  App. at 186-87. 
Boggi's behavior caused Bormann to hire additional security at 
Polo Run, erect fences at the work site, and vary his commuting 
route.  App. at  94, 186.  Thus, Bormann's testimony would 
support a finding that Boggi had used threats of physical injury. 
Otherwise there would have been no reason for Bormann to vary his 
route to and from the construction site.  However, Boggi's 
threats also included an unmistakable threat to cause economic 
harm to the projects and persons involved.  Should the district 
court on remand find that Boggi's threats to cause labor problems 
had explicitly or implicitly involved threats either of physical 
injury or of complete economic ruin, § 2B3.2 would anticipate and 
encompass precisely this sort of conduct.  See § 2B3.2, comment. 
(n.2) ("Even if the threat does not in itself imply violence, the 
possibility of violence or serious adverse consequences may be 
inferred from the circumstances of the threat or the reputation 
of the person making it."). 
15 
 Our decision in United States v. Inigo, 925 F.2d 641 (3d 
Cir. 1991), is not to the contrary.  In Inigo, we addressed 
whether § 2B3.2 or § 2B3.3 (the blackmail Guideline) applies to a 
Hobbs Act conviction involving commercial extortion.  The 
defendant in Inigo had threatened to set up a manufacturing plant 
based on trade secrets stolen from the DuPont company unless he 
was paid $10 million.  The district court applied the extortion 
provision, § 2B3.2, to the blackmail offense.  We held that 
§2B3.2 had been misapplied and that § 2B3.3, the blackmail 
provision, was the applicable Guideline.  In so holding, we 
explained: 
Both the blackmail and extortion section talk 
about a demand for money.  The difference 
between them lies in the kind of harm 
threatened.  We hold that the extortion 
section requires either a physical threat or 
an economic threat so severe as to threaten 
the existence of the victim.  No such threat 
was made in this case. 
Id. at 659.  The district court may properly find on this record, 
however, that Boggi used just this type of threat in threatening 
the economic existence of PCA and the economic ruin of 
Bienenfeld.  
 Inigo does not control here because the commentary to §2B3.2 
specifically states that a court should ordinarily apply that 
Guideline to threats, such as Boggi's, "to cause labor problems."  
Indeed, any other interpretation would run afoul of Stinson's 
holding that the Guidelines commentary is authoritative except in 
very narrowly prescribed circumstances, none of which is present 
here.  See Stinson, 113 S. Ct. at 1915.  If the district court 
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finds, however, that no victim could reasonably have interpreted 
one of Boggi's threats "as one to injure a person or physically 
damage property, or any comparably serious threat, such as to 
drive an enterprise out of business," § 2B3.2, comment. (n.2), 
then the court may sentence Boggi pursuant to §2B3.3. 
  Although it is not clear from the record whether § 2B3.2 or 
§ 2B3.3 is appropriate here, it is quite clear that § 2C1.1 is 
inapplicable to this case.  Section 2C1.1 has consistently been 
applied to bribery or extortion involving public officials in 
this circuit.  In United States v. Badaracco, 954 F.2d 928 (3d 
Cir. 1992), the defendant pled guilty to four counts of 
defrauding a bank of which he was an officer and urged the 
district court to use the "value of the benefit received" formula 
set forth in § 2C1.1 to calculate the loss attributable to his 
fraud.  Id. at 936.  We held that the district court properly 
declined to do so, and in so holding we explained that "[s]ection 
2C1.1 deals with the bribery of public officials or extortion 
under color of official right and is inapplicable to this case." 
Id. at 936 n.8.  Also, in United States v. Schweitzer, 5 F.2d 44 
(3d Cir. 1993), we found no problem with the district court's 
application of § 2C1.1 where the defendant pled guilty to 
conspiracy to bribe a public official to obtain confidential 
information held by the Social Security Administration.  However, 
we remanded for resentencing because the district court cited an 
inappropriate factor to justify its upward departure from the 
sentence recommended by § 2C1.1.  Id. at 47-48.   
17 
 In sum, the district court erroneously applied § 2C1.1 in 
fashioning Boggi's sentence.  At resentencing, the district court 
must make the necessary factual findings to determine whether 
§2B3.2 or § 2B3.3 is the appropriate Guideline.  If the court 
finds that a victim could reasonably have interpreted Boggi's 
threats to cause labor problems as express or implied threats of 
violence to person or property, or of economic harm so severe as 
to threaten the existence of the victim, then the district court 
may resentence Boggi pursuant to § 2B3.2.  If, however, the court 
finds that there was clearly no such threat of violence or 
economic ruin, then it may properly apply § 2B3.3. 
B. 
 In his reply to the Government's cross-appeal, Boggi 
presents two arguments which he raises here for the first time. 
First, Boggi argues that the district court erred in finding that 
he abused a position of trust in committing the offenses and in 
adding a corresponding two-level increase pursuant to § 3B1.3 in 
each of the three offense groups.  Second, Boggi contends that 
the district court erred in concluding that he perjured himself 
at trial and therefore was subject to a two-point adjustment for 
obstruction of justice pursuant to § 3C1.1. 
 "As a general matter, the courts of appeals will not 
consider arguments raised on appeal for the first time in a reply 
brief."  Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 903 F.2d 186, 204-
05 n.29 (3d Cir. 1990).  We follow this rule so that appellees 
are not prejudiced by the lack of an opportunity to respond to 
issues raised for the first time in an appellant's reply brief. 
18 
See Wright v. Holbrook, 794 F.2d 1152, 1156 (3d Cir. 1986). 
However, because of the cross-appeal in this case, the Government 
has had an opportunity to respond to the arguments raised in 
Boggi's reply brief.  Furthermore, Boggi's second argument raises 
a question which we feel requires clarification in this circuit. 
Therefore, we deviate from the general rule primarily to address 
this question.  Before doing so, however, we will briefly address 
Boggi's first argument. 
   The district court's determination that Boggi abused his 
position of trust in the union is subject to review for clear 
error.  See United States v. Craddock, 993 F.2d 338, 340 (3d Cir. 
1993).  The district court determined that, "as a Business Agent 
of the Metropolitan District Council and also as an officer of 
Local 1073, [Boggi] was in a position of trust with regard to the 
union members who elected him to represent their interests." App. 
at 1303-04.  The evidence established that Boggi's union position 
was central to his commission of the offenses proved at trial, 
and we therefore cannot say that the district court's finding was 
clearly erroneous.  The jury's finding that Boggi conducted and 
participated in the affairs of the union through a pattern of 
racketeering activity and betrayed the union membership to enrich 
himself provides ample support for the district court's upward 
departure.  We conclude that the district court properly 
increased Boggi's offense level by two points for abuse of a 
position of trust. 
 The district court's determination that Boggi perjured 
himself at trial is also subject to review for clear error.  See 
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United States v. Cusumano, 943 F.2d 305, 315 (3d Cir. 1991), 
cert. denied,    U.S.    , 112 S. Ct. 881 (1992).  Boggi argues 
that under Dunnigan v. United States,    U.S.  , 113 S. Ct. 1111 
(1993), sentence enhancement for obstruction of justice is 
appropriate only after there has been a review of the evidence 
and a specific finding that there was a "willful impediment to or 
obstruction of justice, or an attempt to do the same, under the 
perjury definition . . . ."  Id. at 1117.  Boggi contends that 
the district court failed to make the requisite independent 
finding.  We disagree.   
 The district court found that Boggi perjured himself at 
trial, observing:  "I don't see how, in view of his flat denials 
and the jury's conviction, that you can find otherwise than that 
he testified falsely on the stand.  That being the case, I feel 
I'm obliged to add the two levels."  App. at 1305.  The issue 
posed to the jury, inter alia, was whether Boggi was guilty of 
the extortion offenses charged.  The jury listened to testimony 
including Boggi's testimony that he was innocent, evaluated the 
credibility of the witnesses, and weighed the evidence.  In 
convicting Boggi, the jury necessarily rejected his testimony 
that he was innocent of the extortion offenses charged.  In 
sentencing Boggi, the district properly considered this fact and 
properly reasoned that "a guilty verdict, not set aside, binds 
the sentencing court to accept the facts necessarily implicit in 
the verdict."  United States v. Weston, 960 F.2d 212, 218 (1st 
Cir. 1992).  Cf. Barber v. CSX Distrib. Servs., 68 F.3d 694, 700 
(3d Cir. 1995). 
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 Although Dunnigan states that "it is preferable for a 
district court to address each element of the alleged perjury in 
a separate and clear finding," 113 S. Ct. at 1117, express 
separate findings are not required.  See id. ("The district 
court's determination that enhancement is required is sufficient 
. . . if . . . the court makes a finding that encompasses all of 
the factual predicates for a finding of perjury."); United States 
v. Matiz, 14 F.3d 79, 84 (1st Cir. 1994).  Here, the district 
court's determination that Boggi perjured himself at trial 
encompassed all of the elements of perjury -- falsity, 
materiality, and willfulness -- and therefore, was sufficient 
under Dunnigan.  This is demonstrated by the district court's 
characterization of Boggi's testimony as "flat denials," which 
certainly suggests that the district court believed that Boggi 
provided false testimony with willful intent, "rather than as a 
result of confusion, mistake or faulty memory."  Id. at 1116. 
While the district court was not explicit about the materiality 
of Boggi's denials, the record reflects that Boggi's false 
testimony denying acceptance or extortion of money and other 
things of value from any of the contractors, App. at 1118-19, was 
necessarily material.  If the jury had believed Boggi's testimony 
and disbelieved some or all of the other witnesses who offered 
conflicting testimony, then Boggi would not have been convicted. 
This determination of materiality is implicit in the district 
court's reasoning and is clear from our independent review of the 
record.  See United States v. Tracy, 36 F.3d 199, 203 (1st Cir. 
1994) ("On review, the appeals court must be able to ascertain 
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the ultimate finding and there must be evidence (regardless of 
whether it has been specifically identified by the district 
judge) that would permit a reasonable fact finder to make such a 
determination . . . .), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 609 (1994). 
Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not err in 
finding that Boggi perjured himself and enhancing his sentence 
accordingly.  Cf. United States v. Webster, 54 F.3d 1, 8-9 (1st 
Cir. 1995); United States v. Rodriguez, 995 F.2d 776, 779 (7th 
Cir. 1993).  In doing so, however, we stress that it is 
preferable for a district court to specifically state its 
findings as to the elements of perjury on the record when 
applying this enhancement.  However, where, as here, the record 
establishes that the district court's application of the 
enhancement necessarily included a finding as to the elements of 
perjury, and those findings are supported by the record, we will 
not remand merely because the district court failed to engage in 
a ritualistic exercise and state the obvious for the record.  
 Finally, Boggi claims that the sentence enhancement for 
perjury effectively penalized him for exercising his right to 
testify in his own behalf.  This claim, however, was rejected by 
the Supreme Court in Dunnigan, 113 S. Ct. at 1117, where the 
Court reiterated that "a defendant's right to testify does not 
include a right to commit perjury."  Thus, we find this claim to 
be without merit. 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
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 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of 
conviction but the judgment of sentence will be vacated and the 
case remanded for resentencing in a manner consistent with this 
opinion.   
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